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Smartphone applications (Apps) can be addictive for users due to their uniqueness, ease-of-use, 
trendiness, and growing popularity. The addition of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into their functionality 
has rapidly gained popularity with smartphone users. Over the years, very few smartphone Apps 
have quickly gained immense popularity like FaceApp and TikTok. FaceApp boasts of using AI to 
transform photos of human faces using its powerful facial recognition capabilities. FaceApp has 
been the target of ensuing backlash against it driving the market for a number of other similar yet 
lesser-known clones into the top ranks of the App stores. TikTok offers video editing and sharing 
of short video clips whereby making them charming, funny, cringe-inducing, and addictive to the 
younger generation. FaceApp and TikTok have been the targets of the media, privacy watchdogs, 
and governments over worries of privacy, ethnicity filters, data misuse, anti-forensics, and 
security. In this paper, the authors forensically review FaceApp and TikTok Apps from the 
Android Play Store, for their data ownership, data management, privacy concerns, 
steganographic use, and overall security posture.
Keywords: Mobile Forensics, Smartphone Forensics, TikTok, FaceApp, Steganography, Privacy, 
Security, Cybersecurity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Global rise in mobile data use has had an impressive trajectory because of customer demands 
over the years. Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association’s (CTIA) 2019 annual report [1] 
showcased the growth metrics from 2017 to 2018 with an unprecedented 82% increase. The 
report also shows that the number of smartphones in the U.S. being used went from 273.2M to
International Journal of Computer Science and Security (IJCSS), Volume (14) : Issue (2) : 2020 38
Ashar Neyaz, Avinash Kumar, Sundar Krishnan, Jessica Placker & Qingzhong Liu
284.7M which is a 4% increase. The Pew Research Center for Internet and Technology reports 
that as of June 2019, 81% of all Americans owned a smartphone [2]. Each variety of cellphone 
requires a specific variety of evidence collection tools and techniques. Furthermore, they all have 
varying mobile apps that collect important data that can be used by forensic phone examiners. As 
the complexity in smartphones and their Apps grow, so must the tools utilized to extract evidential 
data from them.
Forensic investigations concerning someone’s digital footprint are usually of a time-sensitive 
nature. Often, law enforcement agencies must use forensic tools in order to recover digital 
evidence from crimes committed. “Recently the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a warrant is 
required for most searches of cell phones at a scene” [3]. At times investigative agencies must 
request the disclosure of personal information such as calls, texts, and GPS information from 3rd 
party organizations which sometimes requires lengthy court orders. Further challenges 
concerning the use of digital forensic tools are the chain of custody and the experience needed to 
navigate devices (evidence) without altering any information, which could then potentially render 
the evidence as inadmissible in criminal or civil legal court cases [3].
Electronic or Digital Forensics (E-forensics) can be defined as the process of identifying, 
observing, preserving, and analyzing digital evidences by complying with standard operation 
procedures [3]. On the other hand, Anti-forensics closely resemble data concealment by hiding 
evidences or messages into devices to thwart detection and imperceptibility [4]. One way for 
potential criminals to hide information or evidence is by using a technique called steganography. 
This practice conceals a secret information within something else. For example, hiding a secret 
file or message within a digital photo that renders the altered photo to look almost the same as 
the original. Although there are many flavors of digital forensic tools, there remain limitations on 
successfully detecting hidden data using steganographic methods. There are many tools freely 
available to assist newbies and malicious users with stenography techniques. Such tools can be 
employed to conceal information on multi-media data and transmitted via smartphones. Often text 
messages, voice messages, and social media Apps on smartphones act as the medium of such 
transmissions. When developing smartphone or mobile forensic investigation guidelines and 
recommendations, law enforcement agencies must take great care when it comes to 
steganography in mobile devices [5].
Today’s most popular smartphones operate with Apple iOS or Android operating systems, all of 
which require customer interaction through Apps [6] [7]. Extracting evidence from an Android 
smartphone application requires extensive knowledge and experience with mobile operating 
systems (OS) and their file structures. “Android uses packages known as Android Package Kit 
(APKs) to arrange code in an application that also manages that application. An APK file is a 
package of all parts to a specific program. It contains the program code, resources, assets, 
certificate, and manifest file. In general, there is a pre-defined file structure for programming code 
and its resources organized into several folders, those being src/, gen/, libs/, res/, and assets/” 
[8].
Of recent, there are smartphone apps that are powered by artificial intelligence (AI) [9], [10]. AI 
does not just do one thing repetitively; it is intelligent and can do more by adapting to situations. 
Although AI is run by algorithms, it is more “human-like” than traditional machine learning (ML). 
Google’s Android OS uses AI to better Apps such as Google Assistant, which allows for two-way 
communication. AI-powered Apps on smartphones often study user’s device usage like news 
reading choices, behavior, and interests in order to learn and fine-tune their algorithms. However, 
there are privacy issues and concerns [11], [12] on AI being the technological rave these days. 
For example, apps such as the FaceApp which uses AI to process a picture of your face (into 
your older-self or change your face to the opposite sex) comes with privacy and security concerns 
over the Apps permission settings, data storage location (on servers based in a foreign country or 
cloud) and the company’s often irrevocable rights to user data that is sandwiched somewhere in 
their user agreements. AI-powered Apps, while useful, maybe too smart for our own good.
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Popular Apps like FaceApp [13] and TikTok [14] are a craze across the world. TikTok and 
FaceApp have been downloaded by millions of users [15], [16] across Android and Apple Play 
stores. FaceApp offers image transformations that have grown in popularity and TikTok offers 
music-infused virility on the social network platform by helping share short lipsync, comedy, and 
talent videos. Most of TikTok’s Western user-base originally belonged to Musical.ly while its 
Eastern audience still uses a separate version of the App in China called Douyin. TikTok employs 
artificial intelligence (AI) to display personalized content to the user by analyzing user interests 
and preferences through their interactions with the content on the App [17]. While their popularity 
has grown tremendously in the last three years, concerns about their impact on users and society 
have been raised [18], [19], [20], [21]. TikTok addiction is also becoming a concern [22].
TikTok is owned by the Chinese Internet technology company “ByteDance” and was recently 
under investigation by UK authorities for potential mishandling of children’s data [23]. While, 
ByteDance has made some changes since being dragged to various courts across geos, privacy 
concerns continue to be raised since its business relies on user-generated content. FaceApp is 
owned by a Russian company “Wireless Lab” and has attracted criticism of possible data misuse 
and privacy violations [24], [25].
To investigate the above concerns and take a deep dive into these Apps, the authors analyze the 
code behind these Apps and evaluate their robustness against steganographic attacks, privacy, 
and security. Both these Apps are subject to a series of tests that evaluate their security and 
forensic stance. Lastly, their end-user license agreement is discussed around privacy, copyright, 
ownership of user data. Since, these Apps have not yet been thoroughly investigated from 
various viewpoints, the authors propose a methodology through which the analysis of Android 
App artifacts can be assessed for their security, privacy, data management, and forensic 
postures.
2. RELATED WORK
Reverse engineering of application code has long been performed to try and study the code logic, 
architecture, and design. From reverse engineering an application, the code design can be 
reconstructed to a certain degree. Subsequent App cloning by code-reuse and its repackaging 
have been of interest to malware authors. The openness of the Android App market and the lack 
of adequate security testing by App developers have led to malware writers to target these apps 
to create and spread smartphone malware. Gongalez et al. [26] have proposed AndroidSOO that 
targets an extractable attribute called “String Offset Order” to detect such repackaging symptoms 
on Android Apps. While such detection is also possible by comparing App signatures with known 
signature databases, zero-day exploits can still go undetected when using the signature-based 
methods. Rastogi et al. [27] study in detail a few offline and online repackaging detection 
techniques that use different features and metrics to detect similarity of Apps. Lim et al. [28] 
propose a logic to check Apps for signs of application debugging while executing on a jailbroken 
or rooted device. Smartphone forensics tools check for malware as the investigator can take 
necessary precautions when encountering suspicious Apps.
However, traditional smartphone forensic tools struggle to detect anti-forensic approaches like 
steganography which can be a challenge for the forensic investigator when uncovering crime 
facts from smartphone evidence. Sporea et al. [29] study and test free and easy-to-use anti- 
forensic Apps available for smartphones and conclude them to be effective in their functionality. 
The availability of such Apps to trivialize the application of anti-forensics can be viewed as a dual­
edge sword since novice malware authors or scamsters can take advantage of these Apps to 
hide sensitive information and share on social media. Android Play Store and Apple Store have 
increasingly enforced security checks on their portfolio of available Apps for security backdoors. 
Zhou et al. [30] proposed an app similarity measurement system called DroidMOSS and their
experiments concluded that 5% to 13% of Apps hosted on various marketplaces were
repackaged. Balebako et el. [31] conduct a series of interviews with 13 App developers on
privacy and security decision-making and conduct an online survey of 228 App developers to 
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verify if privacy and security behaviors implemented during App development are related to 
characteristics of the App development companies. Their findings suggest that smaller 
development companies are less likely to demonstrate positive privacy and security behaviors 
and App developers were not aware of data collected by third-party tools for ads and analytics 
running on their Apps. While security-driven App development may still be loosely implemented, 
Apps often store user data in the cloud causing additional forensic challenges. Krishnan et al. [32] 
highlight the privacy and legal challenges when working with the cloud leading to forensic 
investigation limitations. To make things complicated, the mix of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
low-cost storage on the cloud results in huge volumes of data that is difficult to access for the 
forensic investigator. Little known to the lay smartphone user, AI-driven Apps and cloud may not 
seem an important issue, but their privacy is at risk. Solanas et al. [33] explain how AI can also 
assist in enhancing security and protecting privacy. There is however a literature gap in 
understanding the privacy demerits of AI coupled with cloud and the craze of video-sharing 
platforms on smartphones. To address these gaps, the authors examine two popular smartphone 
Apps (FaceApp and TikTok) on their coding practices, security posture, anti-forensics, and 
privacy.
3. TEST ENVIRONMENT
The research experiment was conducted to address a few areas of interest like reverse 
engineering of the App files, security, and steganography checks. A separate parallel study of the 
end-user agreement was also undertaken. Table I lists the model of smartphone and App 
versions, while, Table II lists the accompanying software used for the experiment. An online 
product research, cost and prior tool experience helped decide the software applications that 
were used in the experiment. The Apps were downloaded from the Android App store and were 
not activated with any subscription payments in order to mimic their general user base.
TABLE I: Smartphone and Computer Hardware Used.
Smartphone Motorola Nexus 6
Role in Experiment Primary device for FaceApp and TikTok Apps
Sim Card none
Android OS version 7.1.1
Phone Storage 32 GB
Access Level Root
Build Number N6F27M
Smartphone Samsung Galaxy Note 3
Role in Experiment Secondary device with TikTok App. Used to receive 
shared TikTok videos from 
Motorola Nexus 6
Sim Card none
Android OS version 5.0
Phone Storage 32 GB
Access Level Root
Build Number LRX21V.N900KKKU0GPI1
Forensic Computer 64-bit Windows 7 SP1, Intel 
Core i3, 8 GB RAM
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To perform steganography tests, image and video files were edited with secrets and uploaded 
into the Apps (FaceApp and TikTok) utilizing an Internet connection. The images and video files 
were then downloaded from the Apps for analysis. The End User License Agreement (EULA) was 
analyzed for privacy and copyright details from the EULA found on the Google Play store and 
from the company websites.
TABLE II: Software Tools used for In The Experiment.
Software Version
Nexus Root Toolkit 2.1.1
Root Checker Basic 6.4.6
Wireshark 3.0.5




Paraben E3:DS Mobile Forensics 2.1.11597.15639
DB Browser (SQLLITE) 3.11.2
Steghide 3.0
Java 12.0






In this section, the authors describe the environment used to examine the two Apps (FaceApp 
and TikTok). The goal of this experiment was multi-fold and the Internet was accessible for the 
smartphones via a router configured as a Wi-Fi Access Point. To verify the research questions of 
this experiment, the following hypotheses were formulated.
H1: Low-level Digital Forensic data of interest can be extracted by reverse engineering the App 
APK code files.
H2: Network Forensic data of interest can be determined from sniffing network traffic of both 
Apps.
H3: Data hidden (obfuscated) via steganography techniques on video and image files and then 
uploaded to the Apps will be altered during their processing.
H4: Random malware related text/strings when embedded in the metadata of image and video 
files will be removed when processed by these Apps.
H5: The Privacy Agreements of the App companies do not fully guarantee user privacy when 
using the Apps leaving room for concern.
At the very onset of the experiment, the smartphones were factory-reset to remove any previous 
data and the default settings were selected for the two devices. The primary smartphone 
earmarked for the Apps was rooted for this experiment using the Nexus Root Toolkit 2.1.9. The 
secondary smartphone was a Samsung Galaxy Note 3 that was used to receive media files when 
shared via TikTok from the primary Nexus phone. The experiment was divided into four stages; 
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one for reverse engineering the two Apps’ code files, the second for steganography checks, the 
third for security posture, and the last for analysis of the EULA and Privacy Agreements.
The following methodology was followed in sequence for each stage. A Gmail account was 
created for the purpose of this experiment. The smartphone was set up using the newly created 
Gmail account and was used to access the Google Play store in order to download and install the 
two Apps, FaceApp and TikTok respectively. Default settings were chosen for the App 
installations. After the successful setup of the smartphone, a set of images and videos were 
identified for the experiment. The metadata of images and videos were edited to add malware 
names and related data that should raise some sort of security flags when these images are 
processed. Similarly, on the images and videos, hidden strings values were incorporated using 
steganography tools.
Preparing the files for steganographic process: For FaceApp, 12 .jpg images were identified 
along with 2 videos 15-second of .mp4 format for TikTok. Few unique strings/keywords were pre­
identified with Malware and Ransomware names, hashes, etc. to see if they trigger a security flag 
on the back-end cloud servers that process the images and videos of FaceApp and TikTok. Using 
the Steghide command line tool and StegoMagic, a secret message was embedded in the image 
and video files respectively using steganographic techniques.
For embedding steganographic information behind the .jpg files, the following command 
was used in steghide command-line tool:
steghide embed -cf image1.jpg -ef secret.txt
For embedding steganographic information behind the .mp4 files, the following steps were 
performed in the StegoMagic tool as shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1: The process of embedding secret message behind the .mp4 file.
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Furthermore, from the forensic workstation, the malicious malware and ransomware names were 
then added to these 12 images and 2 video files using editing tools like IrfanView and Windows 
File Explorer. Lastly, the files were copied into the smartphone using the forensic workstation in 
order for them to be processed and used by the Apps.
The Nexus and Samsung smartphones were configured to a wireless access point (WAP). A 
wireless router working as a WAP was used for the two smartphones. A D-Link switch supporting 
port mirroring was used to connect the WAP, monitoring PC, and the Internet. Port mirroring was 
enabled on the WAP port of the switch such that all traffic passing through the WAP was mirrored 
to the monitoring PC. Once this design was confirmed as working, Wireshark capture was started 
on the monitoring PC. FaceApp and TikTok Apps were downloaded and installed on to the Nexus 
smartphone. They were opened for use and closed. Wireshark capture was stopped, and traffic 
captured was saved for later analysis. Only TikTok was downloaded on the Samsung smartphone 
as it would be used only to receive any videos posted via TikTok on the Nexus smartphone.
Packet capture for FaceApp: Wireshark captured was started and the identified images with 
edited metadata were uploaded to the Nexus smartphone. FaceApp was opened on Nexus and 
the images were submitted without applying any filters. The choice of not using any predefined 
filters of the App was to avoid filters working on the previously hidden messages behind the 
images. Wireshark capture process was stopped, and the packet capture was saved as a . pcap 
file for later analysis. Images post submission to FaceApp then were downloaded to a forensic 
PC for steganographic analysis.
Packet capture for TikTok: Wireshark captured was started and the videos (previously edited 
with StegoMagic), were shared via TikTok to the public using unique hashtags. The Samsung 
smartphone was used to check for posted these videos via TikTok on the Nexus smartphone. No 
predefined editors of TikTok were used to try and mimic a realistic scenario of a malicious actor 
trying to share videos with hidden messages to a recipient (another TikTok user). Wireshark 
capture was stopped, and the packet capture was saved as a .pcap file for later analysis.
For reverse engineering the two Apps, Androguard was used. Using Androguard, the authors 
were looking for any security flags, privacy, ownership, and general programming discipline like 
class/method/variable naming conventions, meaningful comments, exception/garbage handling 
etc. Androguard modules such as Androlyze, Androdd, Androapkinfo, Androrisk, Androsign, and 
Androxgmml used for analysis. To convert classes.dex files to classes.jar, dex2jar application 
was used. JD-GUI App was then used to view the Java classes of the Apps.
The smartphone was also left powered-on for a day without use. After a day, the smartphone and 
registered Gmail account was checked for any warnings or device alerts from the two Apps.
Paraben was used on the forensic workstation to acquire the Android smartphone using physical 
extraction methods. Both the Apps file locations were identified on the Paraben case and the 12 
images and 2 video files were identified. These files were reprocessed by steghide and 
StegoMagic to check for the secret string. Analysis of the App files was carried out using dex2jar 
and JD-GUI. The Apps database files were analyzed using the DB Browser (SQLLITE) tool. 
Metadata of the images and 2 video files were also rechecked for the previously embedded 
strings.
A. EULA and Privacy Agreements
The authors performed a deep dive into published policies on the company websites of FaceApp 
and TikTok. The authors also reviewed the policies that a user accepts when installing the Apps 
on his smartphone and also the policies available on the Apps’ menus.
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5. ANALYSIS and RESULTS
In this section the authors analyze results from the above experiments and explain their findings. 
Both the Apps (FaceApp and TikTok) were installed on the Nexus smartphone starting with 
FaceApp.
5.1 Reverse Engineering
Androguard [34] is an open source Python-based tool used for reverse engineering the Android­
based applications. Androguard takes the application’s Android package (.apk) files as an input 
and breaks it down for analysis. Androguard can be installed on Windows, Linux, and OSX with 
Python version 3.4 or above as a pre-requisite. In this research Ubuntu Linux distribution [35] was 
used as a platform for Androguard to perform the analysis of FaceApp and TikTok. The following 
command can be used to install the Androguard on Ubuntu.
sudo apt install androguard
FIGURE 2: Method to get the App name.
To start the analysis, androlyze -s command was used in the terminal of Ubuntu. This command 
opens an iPython shell that includes all the modules required to perform an analysis.
To start the analysis, AnalyzeAPK(filename) function was loaded with the .apk file as shown 
below. In this case, the FaceApp apk [36] file was used for the analysis. This .apk file was 
downloaded on 09/13/2019 at 10:27 pm US Central Time.
a, d, dx = AnalyzeAPK(“Downloads/FaceApp v3.4. 14 apkpure.com.apk”)
The three objects are, a an APK object, d an array of DalvikVMFormat, and dx an Analysis 
object respectively. APK object contains get_app_name() method to get the App name as shown 
in Figure 2.
All the permissions in the FaceApp application was obtained by using the get_permissions() 
method of an APK object. FaceApp has the permission to access the internet, access the network 
state, access camera, reading, and writing to the external storage. Figure 3 shows the list of all 
the permissions on the FaceApp App code.
FIGURE 3: All the Permissions in FaceApp.
The APK object also includes get activities method to list all the activities in the application. A few 
of the listed activities are Facebook Activity, Custom Tab Activity, Main Activity, and Matisse 
Activity. Figure 4 shows all the activities associated with the FaceApp application.
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FIGURE 4: All the Activities in FaceApp.
The APK object has get_signature() method that returns the data of the first signature file found 
which can be either v1 signature or JAR signature. Figure 5 shows the signature returned from 
the apk.
FIGURE 5: Signature in FaceApp.
Figure 6 shows the name of the signature file of the FaceApp application. Figure 7 shows the 
details of each permission found in the FaceApp. The get_details_permissions() method return 
the details of all permissions. These details include the protection level, label, and description of 
each permission. APK object contains
get_signature_name() that returns the name of the first signature file found.
FIGURE 6: Signature name of FaceApp.
To start the analysis of the TikTok [37] application, AnalyzeAPK(filename) function was loaded 
with the .apk file as shown below. This .apk file was downloaded on 09/13/2019 at 10:29 pm US 
Central Time.
a,d,dx=AnalyzeAPK(“Downloads/TikTok Make Your Day v13.0.3 apkpure.com.apk”)
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FIGURE 7: Details of Permissions in FaceApp.
The three objects are a an APK object, d an array of DalvikVMFormat, and dx an Analysis 
object respectively. APK object contains get_app_name() method to get the App name as shown 
in Figure 8.
FIGURE 8: Method to get the App name.
All the permissions in the TikTok application were obtained by using the get_permissions() 
method of an APK object. TikTok has the permission to access the Internet, access the network 
state, access camera, reading, and writing to the external storage. Figure 9 shows the list of few 
permissions on the TikTok App code.
FIGURE 9: List of few permissions on TikTok.
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The APK object also includes get activities method to list all the activities in the application. A few 
of the listed activities are Follow Follower Activity, Avatar Choose Activity, Avatar Cut Activity, and 
Welcome Screen Activity. Figure 10 shows all the few of the activities associated with the TikTok 
application.
FIGURE 10: Few Activities of TikTok.
Figure 11 shows the details of each permission found in the TikTok. The 
get_details_permissions() method return details of each permission. The details include the 
protection level, label, and description of each permission. APK object contains 
get_signature_name() that returns the name of the first signature file found.
FIGURE 11: Permission detail in TikTok.
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FIGURE 12: Signature in TikTok.
Figure 12 shows the name of the signature file of the TikTok application. APK object has 
get_signature_name() method that returns the data of the first signature file found which can be 
either v1 signature or JAR signature. Figure 13 shows the signature returned from the apk.
FIGURE 13: Signature name of TikTok.
Users’ personal and financial information is tied to the rise in the use of mobile applications. The 
security of users’ data should be of utmost importance for an application developer. This is the 
reason why the area of reverse engineering is gaining momentum and tools such as Androguard 
help in forensic investigation. The contribution of Androguard towards mobile forensic research is 
twofold. It can be used to reverse engineer mobile applications’ code to check for any security 
vulnerability. Lastly, it can detect changes in applications’ code packaging in order to check the 
integrity of the application.
5.2 Network Traffic
On analysis of all .pcap files from Wireshark captures using port-mirroring, the authors conclude 
that FaceApp uses encryption for all traffic. Thus, it would be difficult for a network sniffer to 
deduce the traffic from FaceApp.
On the other hand, the authors discovered that the videos and thumbnail images received from 
TikTok on the Samsung smartphone were left unencrypted and can be easily sniffed on the 
network. This can potentially compromise the privacy of the user as a malicious sniffer can easily 
deduce the videos surfed by the TikTok user. However, when a video was uploaded from the 
Nexus smartphone, network traffic to TikTok servers was encrypted. Figure 14 and Figure 15 
show the network traffic patterns of these Apps during their download and install on the Nexus 
smartphone. Figure 16, Figure 17 and Figure 18 shows the videos and images that were received 
on the Samsung smartphone as unencrypted.
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FIGURE 14: Sankey Diagram depicting network traffic of FaceApp during download from the Android play­
store and install process.
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cloudfront.net: 157,759
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crashlytics com: 9,976 
facebook com: 39,420 
appsflyercom: 11,083 
amazonaws com: 30,701
FIGURE 15: Sankey Diagram depicting network traffic of TikTok during download from Android play-store 
and install process.
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FIGURE 16: Videos reassembled from TikTok network traffic using Network Miner.
FIGURE 17: Videos reassembled from TikTok network traffic using Network Miner.
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FIGURE 18: Thumbnail images reassembled from TikTok network traffic using Network Miner.
5.3 Steganography
StegoMagic and Steghide were used for steganographic analysis. Stego images and .mp4 
videos were used in FaceApp and TikTok. With FaceApp, images with hidden text message 
information were uploaded for processing by FaceApp. No filters from the FaceApp options 
were applied as this would probably be the best way for an image with hidden-text to be 
processed without FaceApp AI algorithms interference. Alternatively, if a predefined filter was 
applied, it would most certainly allow for AI to be applied by the FaceApp algorithms. The result 
after FaceApp upload and processing was a resulting image without any hidden-text. The 
authors could conclude that FaceApp did indeed strip out the hidden-texts by applying anti­
stego checks.
For TikTok, a hidden message text file was embedded behind the two .mp4 files and was 
shared via hashtags with the public from the Nexus smartphone. The TikTok app on the 
Samsung smartphone received the publicly shared .mp4 files. They were analyzed for the 
previously stored hidden message text. No such hidden texts were found on these .mp4 videos. 
On the source phone, i.e. the Nexus phone, the hidden text files were recovered via StegoMagic 
after saving it back to the forensic workstation. But the actual text in the hidden message file 
was garbled. The authors conclude that the .mp4 files were stripped off their hidden texts by the 
TikTok algorithms on the receiving phone. This would greatly hamper malicious actors from 
sharing the steganographic information on this platform. Figures 19 and 20 show the hidden 
message extraction process and garbled file obtained from the .mp4 files on source Nexus 
phone respectively.
FIGURE 19: The Extraction Process in StegoMagic.
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5.4 Security Posture Evaluation
To ascertain security posture FaceApp and TikTok, metadata of selected images, and .mp4 files 
were edited with texts that would raise low-level security flags. Texts pertaining to malware 
names, popular threat actors etc. were inserted within the metadata of these images and .mp4 
files. Both FaceApp and TikTok stripped away such metadata from the images and .mp4 files. 
The authors conclude that these Apps do possess low-level checks against metadata strings to 
weed out irreverent details. This could hamper malicious actors from utilizing metadata fields of 
images and .mp4 to embed malicious programs or text.
5.5 Analysis of EULA and Privacy Agreements
FaceApp’s privacy policy [38] is available to the public on the Internet. The below can be 
inferred from this policy.
Information Collection
1. The FaceApp company collects user content (e.g., photos and other materials) that
users post through the App service (communications between user and FaceApp).
2. Third-party analytics tools are used by the FaceApp company to measure traffic and
usage trends for the Service.
3. The smartphone’s browser log file information is automatically reported to the FaceApp 
company each time the user makes visits to a web page or App.
4. FaceApp “might” store the photos/image users have chosen to upload in the cloud for a 
short period of time to enhance “performance and traffic” and to avoid repeat bursts of 
uploads of the same image file.
5. FaceApp’s privacy policy clarifies that the App takes additional data like user location, 
IP address, and log file information for the purpose of offering targeted ads at the user.
6. On children’s privacy, FaceApp policy states that it does not knowingly collect or solicit 
any information from anyone under the age of 13.
Information Usage
1. Online ads or other forms of marketing can be personalized and delivered to the user 
and others.
2. Provide, improve, test, and monitor the effectiveness of our Service.
3. Develop and test new products and features.
4. Monitor metrics such as total number of visitors, traffic, and demographic patterns.
5. Information Sharing.
6. FaceApp will not rent or sell user information to third parties outside FaceApp without
user consent, except parties with whom they may share our information.
7. FaceApp may share user content and user’s information (including but not limited to,
information from cookies, log files, device identifiers, location data, and usage data) with 
businesses that are legally part of the FaceApp.
8. FaceApp may remove parts of data that can identify a user and share anonymized data 
with other parties.
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9. Parties with whom the user may choose to share the user content that the user
voluntarily processes with the service, becomes available to the FaceApp anonymously.
10. FaceApp may remove parts of data that can identify you and share anonymized data 
with other parties.
FaceApp boasts of implementing AI-powered selfie-editing and their privacy agreements are 
found in detail on their website on the Internet. However, the average user of FaceApp seldom 
visits and reads the privacy agreement contents detailed on the FaceApp website. Users often 
click through such privacy agreements and notifications. They are also seen to cover the 
company’s potential liabilities. FaceApp processes all its images on its servers and not on the 
smartphone. A user cannot override the App settings to decline access to media storage. The 
App needs access to device storage and the Internet to function. Such a design and the 
company’s decision to store uploaded images/photos on their servers for a short period of time 
raises few controversies over privacy and ownership. On the ownership and copyrights front, 
according to FaceApp, users can request their data to be deleted via the mobile App using 
“Settings ^ Support ^ Report a bug” with the word “privacy” in the subject line. All FaceApp 
features are available without the user logging in and thus FaceApp doesn’t have access to any 
data that could identify a person against the uploaded images/photos. FaceApp has gone great 
lengths to communicate its privacy and ownership policies with concerned users and media. 
The company has clarified that even though the core R&D team is located in Russia, the user 
data is not transferred to Russia.
From TikTok’s publicly available and published privacy policy [39], the below can be inferred 
from this policy.
Information Collection
1. TikTok collects information such as user’s contact details, the content they create,
location, and credit card details.
2. TikTok collects information that the user shares with TikTok from third party social
network providers, and technical and behavioral information about the user’s use of the 
application.
3. TikTok collects information contained in the messages that users send through the 
application.
4. TikTok collects the user’s contacts if they allow access to the phone book on the mobile 
device.
5. TikTok collects user’s comments on the Platform or any other user-generated content 
and video content that users generate through and broadcast from the Platform.
6. TikTok collects the device IP address, location-related data, unique device identifiers, 
browsing history (including content the user have viewed on the App’s platform), 
cookies, mobile carrier, time zone setting, and mobile or device information including 
the model of the device, screen resolution, operating system, App, file names and 
types, and platform.
Information Usage
1. To administer the platform (i.e. to provide the services to the user) and for internal 
operations, including troubleshooting, data analysis, testing, research, statistical and 
survey purposes (i.e. to guarantee the platform’s stability and security).
2. To personalize the content the users receive and provide tailored contents that will be of 
interest to the users.
3. To improve and develop the platform and conduct product development.
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Information Sharing
1. TikTok shares information with business partners so that users receive special offers via 
the platform.
2. TikTok shares information with advertisers and advertising networks that require the
data to select and serve advertisements.
3. TikTok shares information with its cloud storage providers for disaster recovery
services.
4. TikTok shares information with its data centers and IT service providers.
Across countries like the USA, UK, India etc., TikTok continues to be heavily scrutinized by the 
concerned media, government regulators, courts, privacy watch agencies, and activists. While 
privacy concerns with TikTok’s possible storage of data on servers in China are around, much of 
the privacy concerns seem to emanate from its video sharing platform and viewership. A major 
concern comes from its growing younger user base that is a lucrative target for the
advertisement industry. Concerns over the collection of personal information of children, 
cyberbullying, exposing children to sexual predators, pornographic contents, etc. have also 
surfaced. With TikTok, a private account does not guarantee a child’s profile photo, username, 
and other personal information from being visible to all TikTok users. The TikTok App features 
many privacy and safety settings to restrict who can contact and comment on a child’s posts 
and profile. TikTok also features a Digital Wellbeing feature to restrict inappropriate content and 
help parents manage how long children spend on the App. TikTok also has a dedicated privacy 
policy for young users [40].
FIGURE 21: FaceApp Permission. FIGURE 22: TikTok Permission.
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6. CONCLUSION
Applications such as FaceApp and TikTok are currently enjoying huge success and are very 
popular across all ages with a huge spike in their downloads. Their strengths lie in their ease to 
use and the joy or fun that they bring along to the public user. In our evaluation of FaceApp for 
security hygiene and anti-stego checks, the authors found that the App did strip away implanted 
metadata and also removed hidden messages on the images when uploaded for processing by 
the App. These actions would impact malicious users and script-kiddies from using such Apps as 
a platform to share coded data. Steganography analysis has helped in determining that these 
apps strip out the hidden-texts from the uploaded the images that prevents malicious actors from 
sharing the steganographic information on these platforms. The application program code (.apk 
files) was inspected for both Apps to check for any malicious logic that can put a user’s privacy at 
risk. By dissecting the .apk files, the authors found the hexadecimal signatures of the two apps, 
their RSA certificates, the user assigned permissions, and network activities to name a few. The 
analysis of these apps also involved the network traffic analysis that revealed that FaceApp uses 
encryption for all the traffic, however, TikTok doesn’t encrypt the videos and thumbnails while 
transferring it from senders to receivers that makes it vulnerable for network sniffers. The authors 
recommend TikTok to encrypt all traffic irrespective of the type of user (paid or free). The reverse 
engineering of the APK files did show the various permissions that the App used and was found 
to be in-sync with the access permissions visible via the smartphone screen. The authors 
reviewed published privacy policies of both FaceApp and TikTok from the Internet and provided 
highlights while concurring that they seem to cover enough ground for a user. However, periodic 
reviews of their security posture, privacy, ownership, copyrights, and storage locations of these 
Apps are suggested as changes to them via newer versions or security patches can alter their 
architecture and design. As a best practice, the authors suggest the user community to ensure 
that no user sensitive or personal information is included within photos/images and videos when 
using such Apps. With facial recognition stirring up controversies coupled with deepfake 
technology, malicious actors can use publicly available photos to create stunningly realistic 
videos of a person using nothing more than a single image of their face, thereby increasing the 
probability of facial misuse.
In this paper, the authors evaluate FaceApp and TikTok Apps from different viewpoints to 
ascertain their security, privacy, data management, and forensic posture. The authors conclude 
that while it is important to have fun with technology, FaceApp and TikTok App users must think 
carefully about the safeguards they put in place to protect their identity, photos, videos, privacy, 
etc. while also considering the motives of these applications that promote such technology. As 
part of future work, the authors plan to investigate these Apps for their detailed forensic footprints 
and the extent to which they could support a forensic investigation.
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